Jin, Ginger Zhe, and Phillip Leslie. “The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118.2 (2003): 409-451. Print.
This article examines the effects of product quality information to consumers. To do this, Jin and Leslie use data to analyze the effects of the policy change that required Los Angeles restaurants to post the results of health inspections. This policy change occurred unexpectedly in 1998, although health inspections were being conducted prior, the posting of results became mandatory. This study examines data sets from before and after the change to provide evidence of the effects the grade cards have had.
The study examines three different aspects to draw conclusions on the changes that the new health codes have had. The conclusion is that the grade cards caused an increase in the hygiene quality of restaurants. The study shows that the grade cards have increased the awareness of consumers to restaurant hygiene, increased inspection scores, and caused a decrease in the number of reported foodborne illnesses at hospitals. This article was written in 2003 and utilizes hard data from before and after the grade card system was implemented. In terms of restaurants, this study provides hard data to show the positive results of mandatory posting of health inspection grade cards. This article is useful for those wishing to examine the effects mandatory health inspections and public disclosure can have on the hygiene quality of restaurants. This is especially relevant currently as Los Angeles is attempting to develop a system to inspect and require posted results for food trucks.
No comments:
Post a Comment